“Conditional Intentions and Shared Agency”, published Online First in Nous.

It’s open access. Here’s a link: https://philpapers.org/archive/RACCIA.pdf

If you have any trouble accessing it, let me know and I’ll send you a copy.

Abstract: Shared agency is a distinctive kind of sociality that involves interdependent planning, practical reasoning, and action between participants. Philosophical reflection suggests that agents engage in this form of sociality when a special structure of interrelated psychological attitudes exists between them, a set of attitudes that constitutes a collective intention. I defend a new way to understand collective intention as a combination of individual conditional intentions. Revising an initial statement of the conditional intention account in response to several challenges leads to a specification of the properties these intentions need to have in order to be genuine commitments. I then show how a structure of conditional intentions with these properties settles a collection of agents on engaging in social interactions that display all the features typically associated with shared agency.

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