Matthew Rachar

I am a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Vienna on the ERC project “The Normative and Moral Foundations of Group Agency”. My philosophical interests range across philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science, and social and political philosophy. Right now, I'm working on a normative view of collective intention based on the idea that when people do something together they mess with each other’s minds in an obligation-generating way.

Publications

“Normativity in Joint Action”, with J Gomez-Lavin, 2018, Mind & Language

Description: This paper presents empirical research on intuitions about the normative relations involved in joint action. It suggests that the results support a “normativist” view of collective intention.

“Hegemony, Power, and Social Reality in Gramsci and Searle”, 2016, Journal of Political Power, 9(2): 227-247.

Description: This paper attempts a synthesis of work on the nature of social reality by John Searle and Antonio Gramsci. It argues that such a synthesis is mutually beneficial.

“Alignment and Commitment in Joint Action”, 2018, Philosophical Psychology, 31(6): 831-849.

Description: This paper argues against an attempted application of research in cognitive science and social psychology to philosophical debates about joint action. It then argues for a different way of applying that research.

Dissertation "How We Act Together"

Abstract: There is an intuitive distinction between things we do as individuals and things we do together. This distinction has a profound practical importance for us, conceptually, pragmatically, and normatively. Singing a duet is only possible for us if we can do things together. I might be able to solve a puzzle on my own, but not if I want to enjoy myself. And only those people who engage in price-fixing should be punished, not everyone whose individual actions contribute to the resulting price. We have structures of thought and judgment that we use to engage in these endeavors and judge others when they do so. My dissertation is an attempt to identify, characterize, and explicate the concepts involved in these structures of thought and judgment about the things we do together.

Teaching

Curriculum Vitae

Education

2019
The City University of New York

The Graduate Center

PhD, Philosophy (May 2019) Dissertation title: How We Act Together Committee: Carol Gould (supervisor), David Velleman, Jesse Prinz, John Greenwood

2014
University of Vienna

MA, Philosophy

MA, Philosophy (awarded 2014) Thesis title: Collective Intentionality and Coupled Systems Supervisor: Hans Bernhard Schmid

2009
University of British Columbia

BA, Philosophy

BA, Philosophy (awarded 2009)

Publications

2019
with J Gomez-Lavin

“Normativity in Joint Action”

Mind & Language, Early View: https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12195.

2018

“Alignment and Commitment in Joint Action”

Philosophical Psychology, Early View: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1448377

2016

“Hegemony, Power, and Social Reality in Gramsci and Searle”

Journal of Political Power, 9(2): 227-247.

Research Areas

Areas of Specialization: Philosophy of Mind/Action, Social and Political Philosophy
Areas of Competence: Ethics, Philosophy of Social Science, Philosophy of Law

Editorial and Research Experience

Journal of Social Philosophy

Managing Editor (July 2017-May 2019)
Associate Managing Editor (August 2015-July 2017)

Fellowships, Awards, and Prizes

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

Doctoral Award (2017-2019)

The Graduate Center, City University of New York

Provost Pre-Dissertation Research Grant (2016)
Doctoral Student Research Grant (2018)
Graduate Center Fellowship (2014-2019)

University of Vienna

Excellence Scholarship (2013)

University of British Columbia

TREK Excellence Scholarship (2009)

Teaching

Brooklyn College (Primary Instructor)

Introduction to the Problems of Philosophy (PHIL 2101)
Fall 2016, Spring 2017, Spring 2018
Moral Issues in Business (PHIL 3314)
Fall 2015, Spring 2016, Fall 2017

New York University (Teaching Assistant)

Ethics (Phil 40, Primary Instructor: David Velleman) Spring 2018

Presentations

“Why We Need a New Normativism about Collective Action”

European Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Athens, Greece. September 2019.

“A Pathology of Group Agency”

* Group Agency and Collective Responsibility. University of Vienna, May 2019.

“How We Act Together”

* NYU Abu Dhabi Workshop on Normativity and Reasoning. February 2020. Social Ontology XI. Boston, Massachusetts. August 2018.

“Normativity in Joint Action”

* Subjectivity, Normativity, and Acting Together. Humboldt Universität. July 2017. Collective Intentionality X. The Hague, Netherlands. August 2016. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology. St. Andrews, Scotland. August 2016. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Louisville, Kentucky. March 2016.

“Alignment and Commitment in Joint Action”

Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. New Orleans, Louisiana. April 2016.

“Group Responsibility for Dissident Action”

Collective Intentionality IX. Bloomington, Indiana. September 2014.

“Coupling and Collective Intentionality”

European Network for Social Ontology III. Helsinki, Finland. October 2013.

References

Carol C. Gould

Carol C. Gould

Distinguished Professor

Hunter College, Philosophy CUNY Graduate Center, Philosophy and Political Science carolcgould@gmail.com

David Velleman

David Velleman

Professor of Philosophy and Bioethics

New York University dv26@nyu.edu

Jesse Prinz

Jesse Prinz

Distinguished Professor of Philosophy

CUNY Graduate Center jesse@subcortex.com

Samir Chopra (Teaching)

Samir Chopra (Teaching)

Professor of Philosophy

Brooklyn College and the CUNY Graduate Center schopra@brooklyn.cuny.edu

Matthew Rachar

I am a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Vienna on the ERC project “The Normative and Moral Foundations of Group Agency”. My philosophical interests range across philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, philosophy of social science, and social and political philosophy. Right now, I'm working on a normative view of collective intention based on the idea that when people do something together they mess with each other’s minds in an obligation-generating way.

Vienna

matthew.rachar@univie.ac.at

Postdoctoral Researcher

Get in Touch